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THE RHETORIC OF ACCOMMODATION:
CONSIDERING THE LANGUAGE OF
WORK-FAMILY DISCOURSE
KIRSTEN

K.

DAVIS*

I wish to begin with the basic point that as human beings we
perpetually imagine and reimagine the world and reflect what we
imagine in the ways we talk.
-James Boyd White l
Law is more than a set of rules, institutions and processes; it is also a
means of constituting community through a "common language [that describes a] common past, present, and future:'2 Stated another way, the
words of cases, statutes and regulations "verbal[ize] and rational[ize] , , ,
acts, attitudes, and polices," and "coach[ ] , , , attitude[s]" by "deliberately
inventing new abstractions" that draw upon already circulating legal abstractions, 3 Those legal abstractions make up a "weighted vocabulary"
'" Associate Professor of Law and Director of Legal Research and Writing. Stetson University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Elizabeth R. Schiltz and the members of the University
of St. Thomas Law Journal for organizing a wonderful symposium and to Stetson University
College of Law and Sandra Day O'Connor Collcge of Law at Arizona State University for supporting this work. Special thanks to Chris and Casey Reich and Carol Davis for their generous
gifts of the family kind.
I. James Boyd White, Imagining the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 29. 29 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Keams eds .. 1994). See also JAMES BOYD WHITE. HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 36 (1985) (stating that law is "a way of talking about real
events and actual people in the world"),
2. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow. supra note 1, at 28-29, 33, 38. See also Joan C. Williams &
Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated
Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 113 (2003) (noting that "[t]heorists have long
recognized that law serves an expressive function and is constitutive of who we are").
3. KENNETH BURKE, AITITUDES TOWARD HISTORY 254, 291, 322 (3d ed., U. of Cal. Press
1984) (1937) (describing the law as "the efficient codification of custom"). See also KENNETH
BURKE, PERMA1\IENCE AND CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE 187 n.2 (3d ed., U. of Cal. Press
1984) (1954) (describing the law as "an implement for the molding of custom"). Notably. law is
what Burke calls "secular prayer," which he defines as "the coaching of all attitude by the use of
mimetic and verbal language." BURKE, ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY, supra at 322. According to
Burke, law is a resource to be "cashed in on" to invent new abstractions by analogy to existing
abstractions. and legal language" 'takers] up the slack,' between what is desired and what is got

530

2007]

THE RHETORIC OF ACCOMMODATION

531

speech that is "loaded with judgments" and composed not only of "words
alone, but [also of] the social textures, the local psychoses, and the institutional structures {whose] purposes and practices . . . lie behind these
words."4 This vocabulary forms a "terministic screen," which is a filter of
experience that not only "singl[es] out or highlight[s] certain aspects (of
experience] for focused attention," but also makes invisible other aspects. 5
As such, the vocabulary that makes up the terministic screen both "enable!sl . . . observations" and "sets limits on what observations are
possible. "6
Work-family discourse in the law is a terministic screen that filters the
experience of work and family. This discourse orients its participants to
particular ways of thinking about the interconnectedness and segmentation
of work and family, the conflicts between these realms, 7 and the ways in
which individuals navigate boundaries 8 between the two. The language of
courts, legislators and regulators reflects and highlights certain realities
about what is possible for work and family and, at the same time, deflects
and makes invisible other work-family realities.
As a starting point for examining the terministic screen of work-family
discourse in the law, the word "accommodate" might be considered. "Accommodate," the verb, and "accommodation," the noun,9 are words that are
sometimes used in describing how to improve the relationship between
work and family by pursuing "workplace restructuring lO to accommodate
family life," as the title of this symposium suggests. In this context, "accommodate" has been associated with a legal duty of employers to engage
in affirmative behaviors that allow employees who are caregivers to "par... by ... introduc[ing] ... legal fictions and judicial 'interpretations' that ... bridge the gap
betwccn principle and reality." Id. at 291.
4. BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE, supra note 3, at 182.
5. DAVID BLAKESLEY, TIll! ELEMENTS OF DRAMATISM 95 (2002).
6. Id.; see also KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 59 (U. of Cal. Press 1969)
(1945) ("Men seek vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must
develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain
circumstances, function as a deflection of reality.").
7. For a discussion of theories about the mechanisms for linking work and family, including
interconnection, segmentation, and conflict, see Jeffrey R. Edwards & Nancy P. Rothbard, Mechanisms Linking Work and Family: Clarifying the Relationships Between Work and Family Constructs, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 178 (2000).
8. For a discussion of the relationship between work and family as "role transition" or
"boundary-crossing," see Blake E. Ashforth, Glen E. Kreiner, & Mel Fugate, All in a Day's Work:
Boundaries and Micro Role Transitions, 25 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 472 (2000).
9. "Accommodate" and "accommodation" will be used interchangeably throughout this
article.
10. Compare Naomi Cahn & Michael Seimi, The Class Ceiling, 65 MD. L. REV. 435, 457
(2006) (encouraging work-family scholars to do more than "concentrat[e] ... efforts on restructuring the workplace"), with Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32
ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 431 (1990) (arguing that "[n]othing less than a restructuring of the workplace
is necessary" to resolve the conflict between work and family).
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ticipate fully in market work."!! While some have promoted policies that
"accommodate" family life in the workplace,!2 others have criticized "accommodation" as insufficient to capture the most beneficial ways for thinking about the overlapping experiences of work and family.u
"Accommodate" is not only used in discussing the relationship between work and family and what legal approaches are necessary for improving that relationship. Rather, "accommodate" is a term also used in
other areas of legal discourse and, as a result, is a "weighted" term that
carries with it the rhetorical baggage of its use in those contexts. Exploring
existing legal uses of "accommodate," then, can help to make sense of how
meaning is "drawn from"14 those contexts, is transferred into new conversations about work and family, and affects thinking about work-family
policies.
In thinking about how to engage in legal talk about work and family
and how to craft future policies that affect work-family issues, it is important to ask questions that reveal the rhetoric of "accommodation" in currently circulating legal texts. In other words, how does accommodation's
multiple uses in the law shape the meaning of the term before it is even
uttered in the discussion of work-family law and policies? What images,
ideas and meanings are evoked when work-family policies seek "accommodation" of family in the workplace? And, can other terms be substituted for,
or used in conjunction with, "accommodate" that will alter the "terministic
screen" for talking about and experiencing work and family?
This article proposes that "accommodation" has multiple express and
implied meanings and associations arising from its use in legal texts, particularly in those texts that address employer and employee relationships. As a
result, using "accommodation" to talk about policies for workplace restructuring sends particular but sometimes conflicting messages about how to
I L Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in a "Me, Inc." World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 347 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of
Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (asserting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act's religious accommodation provision offers a workable
model for accommodating workers' family demands); see also Debbie N. Kaminer, The WorkFamily Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 305 (2004); cf Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law
Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of the Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001) (arguing for the Americans with Disabilities Act as the model for
work-family accommodation policies).
13. See Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 345,349 (writing about the "limitations of mandated accommodation as a unitary strategy for redressing workplace disadvantage attributable to
caregiving"); Williams & Segal, supra note 2, at 80 (criticizing the use of an accommodation
model for work-family policy proposals).
14. BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE, supra note 3, at 104 (HAbstraction means literally a
'drawing from.' Whenever a similar strain can be discerned in dissimilar events ('drawn from'
them) we can classify the events together on the basis of this common abstraction. And the particular strains which we select as significant depend upon the nature of our interests.").
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improve the relationships between employers and employees concerning
work-family issues, and may impose certain limits for thinking about how
employees can successfully enact their work and family roles. This article
suggests that other terms for expressing the relationship between employers
and employees can reflect different ideas for workplace restructuring and
expand the possibilities for policies to help employees and employers manage the intersection between work and family life. IS
The article heeds the exhortation that studies of work-family issues
must do more than employ traditional legal analysis in exploring the possibilities for restructuring the workplace. 16 Accordingly, the article employs
Kenneth Burke's "cluster" method of rhetorical criticism to explore the
contingencies, hidden meanings and paradoxes of the words "accommodate" and "accommodation" as they are used in four areas of legal discourse. Cluster analysis is useful for understanding these words as used in
the work-family context because cluster analysis gets at our "schema[s] for
orientation"17 about "accommodation" by asking what "goes with," is implied by, and follows from the use of "accommodation" in a text. 18
Using these inquiries as guides for investigation, this article first examines some notable legal sources for the meaning of "accommodate." The
article then examines how these meanings may affect how we understand
"accommodate" when it is used in work-family discourse. Finally, the article offers "facilitation" and "negotiation" as possible alternative or additional terms for talking about the relationship between employees and
employers and restructuring the workplace for family obligations. The article concludes that although "negotiation" and "facilitation" presume a parity between employee and employer not required by "accommodation," the
terms open up the possibility of envisioning workplace restructuring as a
process simultaneously enacted by both employee and employer, where
both share responsibility for and commitment to the restructured environment. Moreover, the terms imply good faith interaction between employees
and employers and provide a vehicle for thinking about work and family as
constituents of individual identity rather than as conflicting spheres to be
managed. 19
15. This article does not directly address using theories of discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act to remedy mistreatment of caregivers in the workplace. See, e.g., Williams &
Segal, supra note 2, at 116 (describing "discrimination language" as helping to "define workfamily conflict as a structural problem that demands structural solutions"). This author acknowledges that "discrimination" can be another terministic screen for understanding work-family
issues.
16. See Dowd, supra note 10, at 43 L
17. BURKE, PERMANENCE A?-lD CHANGE, supra note 3, at 76.
18. BLAKESLEY, supra note 5, at 196.
19. Erica L. Kirby, Stacey M. Weiland, & Chad McBride, Work/Life Conflict, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF CONFLI= COMMUNICATION: INTEGRATING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 342
(John G. Detzel & Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006) (discussing role and identity management in
the context of work-family issues).
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The goal of this article is not to answer the question of what policies to
pursue to restructure the workplace. Further, this article does not seek to set
out a definitive meaning of any term or to suggest foreclosing the use of
any particular term in the pursuit of workplace restructuring. Instead, the
article considers how using "accommodate" as a key term in policy discussions affects ways of envisioning the roles, relationships and possibilities
for work and family. Ideally, this article will not discourage pursuing multiple avenues for improving the relationship between work and family, but
rather will encourage careful thinking about language choices in the pursuit.
I.

"ACCOMMODATION" IN THE LAW-CONFLICTING RHETORICS

"Accommodation" derives meaning-explicitly and implicitly-from
four noteworthy legal uses. 20 The first three meanings of accommodation
emanate from statutory provisions that impose obligations upon an employer to accommodate certain employee characteristics or activities. Two
of these statutes have been used as models for accommodating families in
the workplace;21 the third statute expressly addresses the relationship between work and family. First, "accommodation" is used in the Americans
with Disabilities Act2 2 to describe the duty of an employer to adapt a workplace to provide "reasonable accommodations" to workers with disabilities
who are otherwise qualified for employment,23 Second, the word is used in
connection with the "religious accommodation" requirement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for employees to engage in religious observances or practices. 24
Third, the Family and Medical Leave Act 25 requires employers to accommodate the medical and family needs of employees by giving up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave for specific medical problems and child care needs. 26
A fourth way "accommodation" is used in the law is to describe a
place or location, as in the phrase "public accommodation." For example,
this phrase is used in both the Civil Rights Act of 196427 and the Americans
with Disabilities Ace 8 to describe certain kinds of locations (other than
places of employment) where discrimination is prohibited.
20. There may be. of course, other contexts in which the term is used that may deserve
exploration and could increase understanding of the meaning of "accommodation."
21. "Theorists typically conceptualize the needs of family caregivers within the framework
of 'accommodation!.]' ... [which] is drawn from the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title
VII's provision requiring accommodation of religion." Williams & Segal, supra note 2, at 79-80.
22. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
23. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12111, 12112(b)(5)(A).
24. 42 U.S.c. § 2000eG).
25. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
28. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12181-12182.
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"Accommodation" in the Americans with Disabilities Act

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to
modify working conditions to "reasonably accommodate" employees with
disabilities who can perform the essential functions of the job 29 if the employer does not incur "significant difficulty or expense" (i.e. an "undue
hardship"?O in making these changes. The United States Supreme Court
has said that "accommodation" means that an employer may treat "an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially," and that preferential
treatment is not in and of itself "unreasonable.,,31 The ADA does not, however, define "reasonable accommodation";32 rather, the ADA offers a list of
examples of accommodations that would meet the reasonableness standard.
Examples of "accommodation" include "job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, [or] the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters ... .'>33 Generally, in cases where an employee alleges that an employer has failed to make reasonable accommodations for an employee's disability, the burden of proof first rests with the
employee to demonstrate that a requested accommodation is "reasonable."34
If the employee can meet this burden, then the burden of proof shifts to the
employer to show that the accommodation would pose an "undue hardship"
for the employer. 35 The statute recites a number of factors to consider in
determining whether an employer faces an undue hardship, including "the
nature and cost of the accommodation needed[;] ... the overall financial
resources [of the employer;] ... [the] number of its employees[; and] the
number, type, and location of its facilities .... "36
In addition to its association with "preference," three characteristics of
"accommodate" emerge from the way it is used in the ADA to describe the
employer's requirement to modify the workplace. First, because the adjec29. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1O)(A).
31. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
32. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1423, 1441 (1991).
33. 42 U.S.c. § 121 I 1(9)(B). See also, e.g., Pantazes v. Jackson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69
(D.C. 2005) (noting that "accommodation" means that an "employer must be willing to consider
making changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and conditions in order to enable a
disabled individual to work").
34. See JOHN J. COLEMAN, III, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 6:2 (Thomson West 2006) ("Most courts agree that the employee first must make at
least some showing that specific effective accommodation is possible; then, ... the employer
[must] carr[y the] burden of showing that a reasonable accommodation would impose undue hardship .... ").
35. [d.
36. 42 U.S.C. § l2111(1O)(B).
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tive "reasonable" is attached to "accommodation" in the statute, the statute
implies that without the limits imposed by the adjective "reasonable," an
accommodation is inherently "unreasonable" or, at the very least, ambiguous as to its reasonableness, even in the presence of an "undue hardship"
standard. A case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit demonstrates the rhetorical connection between an accommodation's
unreasonableness and the employer's "undue hardship," as those concepts
function to frame the meaning of "accommodation," even though they designate different burdens of proof. In E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc.,37 the EEOC
sued on behalf of a terminated employee who alleged that her former employer discharged her because of her clinical depression and refused to provide the reasonable accommodation of transferring her to a different
position. 38 The First Circuit considered whether transferring the employee
to a different position was a reasonable accommodation. 39 In considering
the question, the court held that transferring the employee to the new position could not be a reasonable accommodation because "[t]here was no accommodation that [the employer] could make to the [new] position that
would not cause it undue hardship."40 The court said that making the accommodation would require [the employer] to hire new staff, which was a
cost that the small, non-profit employer could not be expected to bearY
The analysis in the Amego case shows that the question of whether an
accommodation is "reasonable" is inextricably tied to the question of
whether an accommodation poses an "undue hardship." Thus, even though
the United States Supreme Court has stated that "reasonable accommodation" is not the "simple ... mirror image" of "undue hardship,"42 the link
between "unreasonableness" and "undue hardship" reinforces the conclusion that inherent in the term "accommodation" is an uncertainty about
whether the term, standing alone, reflects reasonableness. Arguably, given
the way the statute has been interpreted, "unreasonableness" and "undue
hardship" are sufficiently related such that evaluating accommodations for
any "undue hardships" they may impose might be enough to protect an
employer from unreasonable demands. Yet, "reasonableness" is central to
the ADA's protections and is key in the term of art "reasonable accommodation." As such, its presence suggests that accommodation is sufficiently
vague and limitless in scope that, even with the undue hardship standard
operating as an express limit on the kinds of accommodations that are re-

37.
38.
39.
40.

110 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1997),

!d. at 141.
!d. at 147--49,
Id, at 148.
41. [d.

42. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 400-01.
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quired of employers under the ADA, the term "reasonable" must modify
"accommodation" to convey its acceptability as a legal requirement. 43
A second meaning implied by the use of "accommodation" in the
ADA is that accommodations are acts that help employees, who might not
otherwise be able to conform to the demands of the workplace, "fit" into the
existing norms of worker productivity. This connotation originates from the
expectation in the statute that individuals are entitled to "reasonable accommodations" only if they can perform the "essential functions" of the job. 44
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit demonstrated the
link between accommodation and the maintenance of employee conformity
with marketplace norms when it held that an employer is not required to
sacrifice productivity in order to fit an employee into a particular job, even
if the existing "norms of productivity" have been recently changed.45
In Milton v. Scrivner, two employees who could not meet the new
production standards required for grocery selectors at their employer's grocery warehouse claimed discrimination under the ADA. 46 The court found
that it was reasonable for the employer to increase the production standards
to "improve [its] competitiveness in the marketplace."47 Accordingly, because "[t]he changes were aimed at increasing efficiency and productivity
... in order to increase profit," the court found the increase was "not an
impermissible action under the ADA," and the employer was not required
to accommodate employees who could not meet the new productivity
requirements. 48
The metaphor of a puzzle comes to mind when considering the connection between "accommodation" and productivity norms. The workplace
is a puzzle and the workers are some of the pieces; if a piece does not quite
fit, the employer must alter the puzzle just enough so that the piece will fit.
If the puzzle requires too much alteration, however, such that the puzzle
becomes unrecognizable as the traditional workplace, then accommodation
is not required. Accordingly, "accommodation" as used in the ADA reflects
an expectation of employee nonconformity but requires the employer to go
only so far to adapt the workplace to that nonconformity.
Finally, "accommodation" as used in the ADA suggests that accommodations follow from, and rely exclusively upon, the duty of an employer
43. At least one author asserts that, absent other limitations, "the duty to accommodate would
be virtually boundless, limited only by the disabled individual's imagination." Cooper, supra note

32, at 1441. Cooper, however, does not find that limitation in the word "reasonable." Rather, he
identifies the "essential functions" and "undue hardship" language as limits on the duty to accommodate. Jd. at 1442.
44. 42 U.S.c. § 12111(8).
45. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th CiL 1995).
46. /d. at 1120.
47. 1£1. at 1124.
48. ld.; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 364-67 (discussing cases where the
norms of work are the basis for denying an accommodation).
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to take some kind of action. The ADA places the responsibility of making
accommodations on the employer. 49 The statute defines a "covered entity"
as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee,"5o and then assigns liability for discrimination to
that covered entity if it fails to make a reasonable accommodation for an
otherwise qualified employee. 5 I Allocating responsibility to the employer
under the ADA is not unexpected, however, because the employer is often
in the best position to control the workplace and make arrangements to
adapt that setting to the needs of an employee with disabilities.
In sum, the ADA's use of "accommodation" associates the word with
preference; with the inherent potential for unreasonableness; with adapting
the workplace to "fit" a nonconforming employee into the workplace without changing its essential productivity norms; and with employer duty, responsibility and controL
B.

"Accommodation" in the Religious Accommodation Provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of religion 52 and requires employers to "reasonably accommodate" employees' religious activities unless providing the
accommodation would impose an "undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business."53 The language of the Civil Rights Act demonstrates
that it shares the ADA's connection of "accommodation" to "reasonableness" and employer responsibility.54 What is particularly important about
the use of "accommodation" in the context of religious activities, however,
is found first in the different level of burden it associates with making an
accommodation and, second, in the distinction it highlights between accommodating an employee to "fit" into the workplace and accommodating an
employee to be "separate" from the workplace.
An employer's burden of accommodation under the Civil Rights Act is
notably different from that under the ADA. The ADA requires an employer
to make accommodations that do not require "significant difficulty or expense."55 The burden upon employers to accommodate employee religious
practices has been interpreted as much lower, however; employers need
only accommodate employees' religious practices if the burden on the em49. See, e.g., Wade v. DaimJerChrysler Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 m.D. Wis. 2006)
(describing "accommodation" as "some concretc, specific action taken by an cmployer that enables a disabled person to pcrform the essential functions of his position").
50. 42 C.S.C. § 12111(2).
51. 42 U.S.C. § I 2112(b)(5)(A).
52. 42 C.S.c. § 2000e-2(a).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(j).
54. See discussion supra Section I.A.
55. 42 U.S.c. § 12JJI(l0)(A).
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ployer in operating its business is "de minimis."56 The de minimis threshold
has been exceeded in situations where the employer would have to bear
costs imposed by an employee's absence from the workplace, such as when
"the employer would have to make do without the religious employee,
where accommodation would involve the complex shuffling of employees,
... where accommodation would cause a decrease in employee productivity, and where the employer would have to incur the cost of a replacement
employee."57
Contrasting the Civil Rights Act de minimis standard with the ADA's
"significant difficulty or expense" language shows that "accommodation,"
used in the abstract, can invoke conflicting ideas about the degree of effort
required to accommodate depending on the kind of accommodation that is
requested. On one hand, the ADA suggests that if an employee wants to
"fit" into the workplace and its existing norms of productivity, an employer
should bear a burden up to a "significant difficulty or expense" in making
that happen,58 On the other hand, the Civil Rights Act suggests that if workers-who are already physically present and sufficiently productive in the
workplace-seek an accommodation under the Civil Rights Act as a means
to separate from the constraints of the workplace to engage in religious
practices, the costs to employers should be only de minimis. The conflict
about the degree to which an employer should incur costs in providing accommodation 59 based on whether it helps employees separate60 from the
workplace or integrate into it can create ambiguity in what "accommodation" might require as it is used in other contexts.

56. Trans World Airline, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that to require an
employer bear more tban a de minimis cost to provide an employee days off from work for
religious practices is an undue hardship); see also Kaminer, supra note 12, at 355-56 (providing
an overview of the de minimis standard).
57. Kaminer, supra note 12, at 355-56 (footnotes omitted).
58. Arnow-Richman opines, however, that "most accommodations provided under the statute
tend to be modest and relatively inexpensive." Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 364 (footnote
omitted).
59. See Smith, supra note 12, at 1479-80 (recognizing the contrasting interpretations).
60. Religious discrimination claims under Title VII are not limited to situations where an
employee is denied time away from work or altered work schedules for religious practices. Other
situations include, for
where an employee refuses to wear clothing or jewelry required
by the employer, Kreilkamp v. Roundy's, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 903 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (employee
refusing to wear holiday necklace), or where an employee does not comply with workplace
"grooming requirements, Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 419 F. Supp, 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006)
(employee refusing to shave and cut hair on religious grounds). It is possible to also characterize
those situations as ones where employees assert a kind of "separateness" (i.e., a separateness in
"norms" of workplace appearance) that demand a lesser standard of employer burden. The idea
generally is that when an employee privileges those actions or characteristies deemed "private,"
rather than associated with market work, the employer need incur only a minimal burden as a
result.
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The Family and Medical Leave Act 61 (FMLA) directly addresses the relationship between employers and employees with respect to the management
of work and family. The FMLA requires employers to permit certain qualified workers to take unpaid leaves of absence from work for expressly defined health problems and child care obligations. 62 Unlike in the ADA and
Civil Rights Act, the words "accommodation" or "accommodate" are not
routinely used as terms of art in the statute and regulations or when discussing the FMLA.63 The act, however, gives meaning to "accommodate" in
four ways.
First, the FMLA expressly positions the expectations of employers
against the needs of workers with respect to accommodation. The "Findings" section of the FMLA explains that the statute was necessary because
there was "[a] lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents" that could "force individuals to choose between job security and
parenting."64 In contrast, the "Purposes" section of the FMLA recognizes
that permitting employees to take "reasonable [medical and child care]
leave" must be done "in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers,"65 which, according to the Code of Federal Regulations,
are in "high-performance organizations."66 Thus, the FMLA can be viewed
as the means by which Congress intended to simultaneously "accommodate" the "legitimate interests" of employers in "high-performance" workplaces and the needs of employees in meeting both work and family
obligations. 67
Second, the FMLA implies that its statutory accommodations are for
family crises rather than family routines. 68 The stated purpose of the FMLA
61. 29 U.S.C. § 260l.
62. 29 U.S.c. §§ 2611-2612.
63. The word "accommodate" is used in the "Findings and Purposes" sections of the FMLA,
as discussed infra, and is also used in the FMLA's language that pennits an employer to assign an
employee to an "available alternative position" when that position would "better accommodate"
intermittent leave schedules. 29 U.S.c. § 2612(b)(2)(B). See also, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.117
(2007); 29 C.F.R § 825.215 (2007) (stating that the "FMLA does not prohibit an employer from
accommodating an employee's request to be restored to a different shift, schedule, or position
which better suits the employee's personal needs on return from leave ...").
64. 29 U.S.C. § 260l(a)(3).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)-(3).
66. 29 C.F.R § 825.l01(b).
67. See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 357 (stating that the FMLA provides a "fixed
accommodation . .. to employees with particular family caregiving responsibilities") (emphasis
added).
68. See Lisa Bomstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values
and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, \0 COLUM. I. GENDER & L. 77,
124 (2000) (noting that the Act "provides leave only in crisis situations"). Legal scholars have
also recognized that the FMLA is based on a medical model; that is, the FMLA limits the
worker's legally cognizable role as a family member to one who deals with serious, intennittent
family medical issues rather than one who handles the routine issues of caregiving. See, e.g.,
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is to reassure employees "that they will not be asked to choose between
continuing their employment and meeting their personal and family obligations" when "a family emergency arises."69 As such, the FMLA reaches
only "serious health conditions" of an employee or a statutorily defined
family member that require "inpatient care in a [medical facility]" or "continuing treatment by a health care provider."70 The Department of Labor
defines "continuing treatment" as that which involves, among other things,
incapacity of "more than three consecutive calendar days" or any period of
incapacity that results from a "chronic serious health condition."71 Thus, the
FMLA does not cover short-term, common, acute illnesses, such as a cold
or the flu, that require the worker to be away from work for a day or two at
a time,72 and it does not provide a worker-parent with unpaid leave for the
minor childhood illnesses that routinely require a parent to stay home with a
sick child for a day or twO. 73 Moreover, although the FMLA leave is permitted for the birth or adoption of a child, that twelve weeks of leave must
be taken within the first twelve months following birth or adoption.74 This
limitation suggests that the critical demands upon a worker of having a new
child in the family is time-limited; the routine demands imposed upon a
family member by a child, such as school conferences, doctor's appointments, or vacations and holidays where child care is unavailable, are not
recognized by the FMLA.75
Third, the content of the FMLA's requirements suggests that accommodating family life in the workplace means maintaining a distinct boundary between work and family; it provides detailed language describing the
role of employers and employees in navigating that boundary when necesMaxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 133 (1998).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101 (b).
70. 29 L.S.C. § 2611(11).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2).
72. See 29 C.P.R. § 825.114(c) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, unless complications arise, the
common cold, the flu, ear aches, upset stomach, minor ulcers, [and] headaches other than migraine
... do not qualify for FMLA leave").
73. For example, many child care facilities and schools prohibit a child from returoing to
school or daycare until the child has been fever-free for twenty-four hours. A child who has had a
mild cold with a fever, for example, likely will be required (if the parents and the child care
facility or school are following the rules) to stay home one additional day after the fever passes.
Thus, minor childhood illnesses can require a parent to find alternative care for a child for at least
two days. Multiplying these days by multiple sicknesses and multiple children can significantly
increase the amount of time a worker could need to be absent frum work to attend to a sick child,
even though those illnesses are not considered "serious."
74. 29 L.S.c. § 2612(2).
75. State statutory schemes have attempted to partially fill the gap left by the FMLA. See,
e.g., 149 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52D (2007) (providing twenty-four hours of leave for
worker to attend child's school activities or doctor's appointments); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.159
(2005) (requiring employers to provide leave to employees to "care for a child of the employees
who is suffering from an illness, injury or condition that is not a serious health condition but that
requires home care").
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sary. Under the FMLA, an employer accommodates an employee's "separation" from the workplace for medical and child care crises by providing a
leave of absence and then subsequently "fitting" the employee back into the
workplace when the crisis has ended. As in the ADA and the religious accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act, the degree of burden required by the employer in providing accommodation is connected to
whether the employee is physically separated from work or seeking continued access to it.
An employer is required to give only unpaid leave to accommodate an
employee when she "separates" from work to attend to family life. 76 When
the employee wants to come back to work, however, the FMLA requires the
employer to take more significant steps to "fit" the worker back into the
workplace. In most cases, the FMLA requires 'the employer to restore the
employee to the same position as before the FMLA leave or to another
position with equivalent "benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions."77
This is true even if the employer replaced the employee or restructured the
workplace to deal with the employee's absence. 78 Moreover, an employer
may be required to continue to pay other benefit premiums while the employee is on leave to ensure that the employee will have those same benefits
on return.19 The employer, then, faces a potentially greater administrative or
economic burden to accommodate the return of the employee to the workplace because the demands are more onerous than simply providing unpaid
leave.
Finally, discussions surrounding the FMLA reinforce the idea that "accommodation," standing alone, carries with it a potential for "unreasonableness" that must be addressed by imposing strict limits on what actions of
accommodation are statutorily required. Public discussions about the
FMLA reveal concerns that employees abuse the FMLA.80 The Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor recently requested public comments on the FMLA, noting that "[e]mployers contend that one of the unin76. 29 U.S.CO § 26l2(c). An additional requirement is that the employee's "group health
plan" coverage must be continued during the unpaid leave. 29 U.S.C. § 26l4(c)(l). If, however,
an employee fails to return from unpaid leave in certain circumstances, the employer can "recover
the premium that the employer paid for maintaining [the employee's] coverage" during the leave,
29 U.S.CO § 26l4(c)(2). thereby rcducing the employer's cost if the employee does not return to
the workplace.
77. 29U.S.C. § 26l4(a)(l). One commentator notes that the legislative history of the FMLA
characterizes the "equivalency" standard a "stringent" one. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
ACT 256 (Michael J. Ossip & Robert M. Hale eds., 2006).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (2007); but see Kaminer, supra note 12, at 355-56 (describing
the development of case law under the Civil Rights Act that expressly establishes that employers
are not expected to bear these burdens in accommodating religious practices).
79. See THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, supra note 77, at 256.
80. E.g., Molly Sevin, Family Leave Act Being Reviewed: Businesses' Complaints That
Workers Abuse the Law Prompt the U.S. to Seek Public Comment, L.A. TIMES.COM, Feb. 6. 2007
(noting that "managers say [that] workers' abuse of the law causes scheduling nightmares. lost
productivity and often escalates into costly lawsuits").
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tended consequences of the FMLA regulations has been that employers
have little recourse to prevent those employees who take FMLA leave improperly from doing so .... "81 In the same request for information, the
Department of Labor asked for commentary on the minimum days of incapacity required for a "serious medical condition" and on whether "intermittent leave" for things like chronic health conditions is overly burdensome
on employers. 82 Some organizations support regulatory changes that would
increase the number of days of incapacity for an illness to qualify for leave
under the FMLA and would restrict the ability to take intermittent leave. 83
These criticisms and potential changes to the FMLA reinforce the idea
that "accommodation" is seen as reasonable and manageable only when,
paradoxically, an employee faces something so serious that the employee
must separate from the workplace for a lengthy time. Conversely, the concerns voiced about the FMLA's requirements that employees be given intermittent leave for chronic conditions show that "accommodation" may be
associated with unreasonableness when it is linked with the more frequent
concerns or more mundane events of an employee's family life. Adding this
to the FMLA's stated purpose that it seeks to accommodate the needs of
workers in their family lives demonstrates that the FMLA envisions accommodations as reasonable when they are for family events that are extraordinary but not routine.
In sum, although "accommodate" is not used as a term of art in the
FMLA, it still obtains much of its legal meaning from the ways in which the
FMLA implicitly defines the term. The FMLA envisions accommodations
for work and family as demanding recognition not only of the employee's
family needs but also of the employer's interest in "high performing" organizations. As part of this overt recognition of the employer's needs, the
FMLA implicitly limits the meaning of the phrase "family life" to crisis
situations and downplays the demands of routine family matters. The
FMLA also treats family and work as mutually exclusive realms and places
different burdens of accommodation on the employer depending on whether
the employee is separating from or re-entering the workplace. Finally, the
FMLA associates accommodation with potential unreasonableness resulting
from workplace adjustments to address routine family issues.
D.

Public "Accommodation" Under the ADA and the Civil Rights Act

A final area for interrogating the meaning of "accommodation" that may
not be immediately obvious, but is significant, is where the term is used to
describe a "place" where certain types of discrimination are prohibited. In
81.
69,504,
82.
83.

Request for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 69.507 (Dec. 1,2006).
Id.
See, e.g., Sevin, supra note 80.
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particular, the ADA and the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in places of "public accommodation."84 When "accommodation" as a term is associated with a place, it invokes meanings that are not
traditionally associated with the employer-employee relationship.
First, "accommodation" as place in the ADA and Civil Rights Act implies a host-guest relationship between the party providing the accommodation, the host, and the party invited to use the accommodation, the guest.
The ADA includes in the definition of "public accommodation" private entities that "serv[e] food or drink,"85 provide "exhibition or entertainment,"86
provide a "place of public gathering,"87 act as a "service" or "social service" establishment,88 or provide "a place of exercise or recreation. "89 The
Civil Rights Act includes similar entities and further mentions that "public
accommodations" include establishments that "serv[e] patrons. "90
The Civil Rights Act and the ADA require a public accommodations
provider to make available without discrimination the "goods, services, facilities, privileges, [and] advantages" at the place of public accommodation. 91 Imposing this duty upon the public accommodation provider makes
sense under the circumstances; there is little, if any, authority that an individual, acting as a guest or patron, can exercise over the kinds of places
described in the statutes, including, for example, inns, restaurants, theaters,
stadiums, parks, train stations, libraries or day care centers. 92
Second, not only does the term "accommodation" as place invoke
ideas of service and patronage, it includes locations that are used for activities of relaxation, pleasure and entertainment. The Civil Rights Act generally categorizes public accommodations as "inn[s]"-places to sleep;
"restaurant[s],,-places to eat; or "places of ... entertainment"93-places to
play. Within this scheme, certain types of locations fall outside this meaning of accommodation. For example, one court held that although the Civil
Rights Act could include "health spas, golf clubs, and beach clubs," the
84. 42 U.S.c. § l2l82(a) ("No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of public accommodation .... "); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(a) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of ... any place of
public accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race. color,
religion or national origin.").
85. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(B); 42 U.S.C. 2000a(b)(2) ("selling food for consumption on the
premises").
86. 42 U.S.c. § 12l8l(7)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(3).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(0).
88. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(F), (K).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
90. 42 U.S.c. § 2000a(a)(4).
91. 42 U.S.c. § 2000a(b); 42 U.S.c. § 12182(a) (discrimination prohibited "by any person
who owns, leases .. or operates a place of public accommodation").
92. See 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7).
93. 42 U.S.c. § 2000a(b). The AOA definition provides a more expansive list of places for
recreation or entertainment and also includes service, sales. rental, and social service establishments in its definition. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7).
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definition of "accommodation" under the statute was not broad enough to
include retail stores such as barber shops because a barber shop was not a
"place of entertainment."94
Finally, implicit in "accommodation" as place is the idea that the guest
is being passive or engaging in activities of diversion. One federal district
court, for example, interpreted ''place of entertainment" under the Civil
Rights Act to include" 'establishments [that] present shows ... to a passive
audience. '''95 Another case defined "entertainment" under the statute as an
"agreeable occupation for the mind; diversion; amusement .... "96
In sum, meanings associated with "accommodation" as place invoke
images of a host-guest relationship where the emphasis is often on relaxation, amusement and entertainment-terms not generally used in describing
the relationship between employer and employee or in describing the workplace. Both the ADA and the Civil Rights Act distinguish between discrimination in places of employment and places of public accommodation,97
which further demonstrates that "accommodation," as a legal term, can
have multiple connotations depending upon the nature of the relationship it
mediates.

II.

ACCOMMODATION RHETORIC: IMPLICATIONS FOR
WORK-FAMILY DISCOURSE

As the previous sections describe, a rhetoric of "accommodation" exists from its current uses in legal discourse and provides "a set of topics, a
set of terms ... , and some general directions as to the process of thought"98
for discussing and ultimately implementing policies to "restructure the
workplace to accommodate families." This section offers some thoughts on
what topics and terms "accommodation" brings into focus for attention,
what it hides from view, and what conflicting meanings, ambiguities, and
processes of thought it might create when used in work-family discourse.
"Accommodation" in the legal discourse discussed above is used in a
way that it refers to both employee nonconformity and to an envisioned
"ideal." For the ADA, the nonconformity at issue is a disability that requires alteration of the workplace; for the Civil Rights Act, it is a religious
94. Halton v. Great Clips, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 856, 862 (N.D. Ohio 2000). Notably, the ADA
expressly includes barber shops in its delineation of "public accommodations." 42 U.S.C.
§12181(7)(F).
95. United States v. L.c. Vizena, 342 F. Supp. 553, 554 (W.D. La. 1972) (quoting Miller v.
Amusement Enters., Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1968) (en banc».
96. Halton, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
97. The ADA separates "public accommodation" from "employment" in its list of critical
areas where "society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.c.
§ 12111(a) (2000). In the Civil Rights Act, discrimination in employment and in public accommodations are treated in separate subsections. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (public accommodations); 42 U.S.c. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (employment).
98. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note I, at 41.
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practice that normally would not be acknowledged in the workplace; for the
FMLA, it is the state of having serious health conditions or new children
that, without accommodation, might result in the employee either continuing to work as "normal" or leaving the workplace permanently. In combination, these uses demonstrate that "ideal" workplaces have "ideal workers,,99
whose work lives are not affected by disabilities, religious practices, serious
health conditions or children unless an employer is specifically directed to
accommodate those nonconforming traits or states in the workplace. Rachel
Arnow-Richman posits that the ADA, for example, could envision "accommodation" as "job restructuring and modified work schedules," and could
"challenge features of work rooted in the 'ideal worker' norm" but does
not. 100 Thus, using "accommodation" to describe work-family relationships
conjures up two competing meanings. On one hand, "accommodation" calls
attention to the fact that traditional notions of workers, workplaces and
workplace standards do not accurately ret1ect reality. On the other hand,
"accommodation" perpetuates the idea that the "ideal worker" exists, and
only through exceptions in the form of accommodations can other workers
who are not "ideal" be included in the workplace.
"Accommodation" also carries with it the difficulty of having multiple
meanings regarding the kinds of activities that the word encompasses. That
is, accommodation is expressly linked to the notion of "crisis," particularly
in the FMLA, and it is also linked to ideas of relaxation, entertainment,
diversion or passiveness when it is used to describe a place. Interestingly,
what might result from these conflicting meanings is that "accommodation"
may prove difficult to associate with the routine and mundane matters of
everyday life. Accommodation's link to "crisis" may draw attention to the
kinds of extraordinary (and often temporary) medical and family crises.
Conversely, "accommodation" as relaxation and entertainment focuses on
ways to escape from the demands of everyday life. Neither of these uses
connote that "accommodation" should apply to the needs of employees in
managing their routine obligations to both their families and employers. WI
Moreover, what follows from the FMLA and the employment discrimination provisions of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act is ambiguity about
the nature of the employer's burden in a statutory scheme that requires the
employer to accommodate family in the workplace. For both the ADA and
Civil Rights Act, accommodations must not impose an "undue hardship";
99. Joan Williams describes one view of the "ideal worker" as one who "works full time and
overtime and takes little or no time off for childbearing or child rearing." JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT I (2000). See
also infra note 106 (describing the ideal worker).
100. Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 366-67.
101. For example, neither view of accommodation would encompass an "employee who returns from FMLA leave following the birth of a child [who could use assistance] in balancing her
job and the care of a three-month-old infant." Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 368 (describing
the limits of the FMLA).
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what counts as "not undue" ranges from a burden just short of a "significant
difficulty or expense" to no more than a de minimis burden. One perspective is that accommodations are expensive, and Joan Williams and Nancy
Segal have argued against an accommodation model for work-family restructuring because the "traditional assumption [in the context of workplace
restructuring is] that accommodation is costly."I02 Alternatively, accommodations can be viewed as inexpensive, and employers making accommodations could be subject to the de minimis burden under the Civil Rights Act,
which has been described as so insignificant that it "renders the accommodation requirement virtually useless .... "103
Given these conflicting burdens associated with accommodation, there
exists no certainty about how policies seeking "accommodation" for family
demands in the workplace will be interpreted. Particularly, if the kinds of
accommodations requested include those that reflect routine family matters,
then it is possible that the burden associated with "accommodation" would
be closer to de minimis because a routine matter is not a crisis. Whether an
employer should bear de minimis or significant burdens in accommodating
family in the workplace is certainly debatable. Regardless, when using the
word "accommodation" in the work-family debate, one is left with the
question of which view of "accommodation" will be taken. Will the burden
on employers be viewed as substantial or as small and insignificant? Depending on the way the ambiguity is resolved, what does this mean for the
kinds of accommodations that can result?
The shifting degree of burden placed upon an employer in making
"reasonable accommodations" also implies that the meaning of "accommodation" changes based on whether the conflict between employer and employee is resolved more in favor of the employer's interest in maintaining
norms of productivity and high performance or more in favor of the employee's interest in dealing with family issues. Under the ADA, when personal characteristics in the form of a disability limit an otherwise qualified
employee from performing a job, greater responsibility is placed upon the
employer to accommodate that employee's "fit" into the workplace. Here,
the ADA suggests that the "fit" will "necessarily reflect dominant norms
and expectations about work,"104 which means that "accommodation" is
seen as upholding the employer's expectations of traditional worker productivity. Conversely, under the Civil Rights Act, when religious practices interfere with work obligations, an employer is expected to incur only de
102. Williams & Segal. supra note 2. at 86.
103. See Smith. supra note 12. at 1479 n.201 (recognizing and citing commentators that make
this assertion). Smith also attempts to reconcile these competing meanings by suggesting that
"accommodation" in the context of work-family policies should impose a "moderate" cost upon
employers. ld. at 1480. This is a useful suggestion, but it does not resolve the problem of the
mUltiple meanings associated with the cost of accommodation; instead, it adds a third meaning.
104. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11. at 367.
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minimis costs to privilege an employee's personal or private obligations. In
that case, "accommodation" suggests the personal interests of the employee
take precedence over the dominant norms about work, but only at a minimal
cost to the employer.
Under the FMLA, this boundary between work and family and the
relationship between the burden and direction of movement-either into or
out of the workplace-is even more intensely highlighted. Where the employee privileges family over work-for example, to take a leave of absence to care for a new baby-the employer has more limited obligations.
Yet, when the employee privileges work over family obligations when retuming to work, the employer has the obligation of making the employee's
job available to her. lOS In these situations, the burden faced by the employer
is arguably tied to whether the accommodation is viewed as consistent or
inconsistent with the employer's interests in workplace productivity.
"Accommodation" in the context of work-family issues also implies
that employees' needs and legitimate employer expectations for high performance are in conflict. The phrase "reasonable accommodation" in the
ADA and Civil Rights Act suggests that an employee's request for an accommodation, without limits, is unreasonable (and even abusive) or, at the
very least, is inconsistent with the employer's goals. This concern about
unreasonableness is further perpetuated when an employer's expectation of
a "highly performing" workplace under the FMLA is joined with accommodation's connection to entertainment, rest, passiveness and diversion in the
context of "public accommodation." Combining these meanings suggests
that accommodating employees' family demands could mean providing
those things that are counter to "high performance" in the workplace, such
as intensity, focus and assertiveness. Moreover, to the extent that routine
matters are envisioned as something to be accommodated, the association of
"accommodation" with "diversion" might suggest that employees are seeking accommodations for those things that (regularly and perhaps unnecessarily) "divert" them from workplace duties and activities. It would not be a
stretch, then, to expect that if "accommodation" is viewed through this filter, some audiences would be inclined to view policies seeking accommodations as antithetical to employers' goals. At the very least, this sense of
"accommodation" ties directly to concerns employers have expressed with
respect to the FMLA of employees' abusing the accommodations provided
under the statute.
Relatedly, "accommodation" suggests that employers, not employees,
are exclusively responsible for and have the duty of extending "preferences" to accommodate family in the workplace. As such, using the term
"accommodation" in work-family discussions necessarily means talking
105. Arnow-Richman notes, however, that the judicial interpretation of the reinstatement provisions has limited their scope. !d. at 369-73.
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about extending accommodations-that is, preferential treatment-from
work to family because the norm is that "ideal workers" should have no
family demands that impact them in the workplace and thus need no preferential treatment. 106 In that construction, employers will be expected to take
the lead in making those changes while employees are divested of agency in
the process. Moreover, "accommodations" have been characterized as actions that "contradict business judgment.,,1Q7 Because "accommodations"
are deemed to contradict business judgment, because the employer has been
described as bearing all of the burdens for making accommodation, and
because accommodations can be seen as "preferences," the discussion can
then turn, as it has in the discussion surrounding the FMLA, on the need for
protecting employers against unreasonableness, abuse and loss of "high performance.',1Q8 And, where the language of "accommodation" implies that
employers may be subjected to unreasonable demands of employees in the
absence of express limits, it may be difficult to use the term to craft policies
that avoid characterization as "preferences" and that reconcile an employer's good business judgment with the employee's need to effectively
manage work-family issues.1Q9
As is always true, more investigation might lead to finding other ways
"accommodation" is used in legal discourse and to further interpreting the
term in the context of policies to restructure the workplace for the benefit of
families. The discussion above, however, attempts to demonstrate that a
"terministic screen" has developed around the word "accommodation" as it
is used in legal discourse that is a "selection[ 1 of reality" and simultaneously "a deflection of reality." 1 10
In sum, the forgoing discussion should serve as a reminder of the
meanings that can be conveyed when "accommodation" is used in workfamily talk. If "accommodation" is associated with "nonconformity," then
using "accommodation" in work-family policies might convey the idea that
workers who have family obligations are outside the norm. Requests for
106. The "ideal" worker is an individual unencumbered by child care or other nurturing responsibilities. Kessler, supra note 12, at 430; see also Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica
Biernat, The Maternal Wall, 60(4) J. Soc. ISSUES 675, 677 (2004) ("Workplace ideals ... are still
defined around men's bodies-since men need no time off for childbirth-and men's life patterns,
as American women still do 70% to SO% of the child rearing."); WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at
20-24 (discussing the dominant view that employers are entitled to ideal workers).
107. Arnow-Richman, supra note II, at 373.
lOS. See Bornstein, supra note 6S, at 90 (noting that "the Act's twin goals-to 'simultaneously preserve the integrity of the American family and promote business interests' -are inconsistent and incompatible, setting up a clash between market driven policy and family values which
results in a limited, incoherent policy") (citations omitted).
109. For an example of a policy that does both, see Project for Attorney Retention, The Business Case for a Balanced Hours Program for Attorneys, http://www.pardc.orglLawFirmlBusiness
_Case.htm (noting that a business case for "balanced hours" is different from "special
accommodation").
110. BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 6, at 59.
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accommodation might be heard as requests for preferential treatment or to
fulfill employees' needs for relaxation, entertainment or diversion rather
than to meet important, but routine, family demands. Conversely, the term
can invoke images of crisis rather than routine, thus limiting which employees' needs as family members might be accommodated. In the absence of
the word "reasonable," a workplace restructuring policy seeking accommodations might be seen as potentially unreasonable or fraught with opportunities for employee abuse. Accordingly, the focus of debate might be on the
kinds of limitations to place upon accommodations rather than on the ways
for making the relationship between work and family most productive for
both employers and employees. Accommodations might be seen as overly
expensive for employers or, alternatively, as requiring employers to carry
only a very small burden, particularly where "accommodation" means permitting employees to leave work to attend to family responsibilities. Policies seeking accommodations may be deemed a demand placed upon
employers that creates no concomitant responsibility for employees to participate in making the relationship between work and family a workable
one.
III.

WHAT ELSE BESIDES "ACCOMMODATION?"-ALTERNATIYE
TERMS, DIFFERENT SCREENS

Other than using "accommodation" as a key term in pursuing workplace restructuring, what other terms might usefully fill the blank in the
phrase "workplace restructuring to __ family life?" This section offers
some preliminary thoughts on "facilitate" and "negotiate" as potential alternative terms for work-family dialogue. These terms can offer "an alternate
vocabulary [for] speaking and being" 111 that might transform both identity
and experience in the context of work and family.
"Facilitate" and "negotiate" are not interchangeable terms, and in some
contexts, one term might work better than the other in describing workfamily policies. In combination, however, they suggest a collaborative, consensus-building relationship between employers and employees where the
employer assists the employee in meeting both work and family responsibilities, where the employee has a voice in and shares responsibility for the
conditions in which those obligations are met, and where the emphasis in
successfully navigating work and family is, in part, based on assisting employees in managing their identities-not just their logistical difficultiesas both workers and family members. Thus, alternative phrases employed in
discussing potential workplace restructuring may be "workplace restructuring to facilitate movement between work and family life" or "workplace
11l. Sarah J. Tracy & Angela Trethewey, Fracturing the Real·Self?Fake.Self Dichotomy<->
Moving Toward "Crystallized" Organizational Discourses and Identities, 15(2) COMM. THEORY
168, 170 (2005).
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restructuring to help employees negotiate their identities as workers and
family members."
"Facilitate" is generally associated with making the performance of
something easier or "lessening ... resistance."] 12 In the legal context, one
state Administrative Procedure Act defines a "facilitator" as one who is
"impartial," "assist[s] ... to achieve consensus," and "coordinate[s]."113
Other statutes connect the term to "develop[ing] guidelines, policies, and
procedures [to] allocat[e] ... available resources";] 14 to providing education and documents, setting up schedules, and providing assistance; liS and
to helping with understanding and communication to enable another "to
participate as fully as possible."116 "Facilitation" has also been statutorily
defined as "enabl[ing an individual] to ... participate ... in the decisions
and choices that effect his or her life." I I7 Importantly, "facilitate" has not
been interpreted as a guarantee of success in a given situation; rather, it has
been seen as a way "to make easier, to aid, to assist." I 18
"Negotiate" is associated with "confer[ring], bargain[ing], or discuss[ing] with the view to reach an agreement" and, with respect to space or
location, "succeed[ing] in crossing, surmounting, or moving through."1l9
Statutes have defined it to mean "transfer[ring] ... possession" in the traditional context of "negotiable" transactions,] 20 "confer[ring] or offer[ring]
advice," 12 I and making a "good faith effort to reach [an] agreement [that
will] ... be[] binding.,,122 With respect to ethics, "negotiate" has been
associated with qualities such as truthfulness, fairness, candor, respect,
112. See. e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (3d ed.) (1988) (defining "facilitate" and
"facilitation"); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 690 (2d ed.) (2001) (defining "facilitate" as
"to make easier or less difficult; help forward"). See also Bruno v. United States, 259 F.2d 8, 10
(9th Cir. 1958) (citing Webster's Unabridged Dictionary for the "common and ordinary definition
[of facilitate] as '[t]o make easy or less difficult; to free from difficulty or impedimcnt; as to
facilitate the execution of a task"). Black's Law Dictionary defines "facilitate" solely in the context of criminal offenses, stating that "facilitate" means to H[t]O make the commission of a crime
easier." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (7th ed. 1999).
113. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.760 (2006) (describing the role of a facilitator for rule-making).
114. ALA. CODE § 12-15-171 (2007) (describing the duties of a children's services facilitation
team).
115, CAL. FAM. CODE § 10004 (2007) (describing duties of a "family law facilitator").
116. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1954.5 (2007) (describing the duties of a probate facilitator).
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4512(g) (2007).
118. See In re Doe, 805 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Haw. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 571-63 (1985), which provides that a judge ean terminate parental rights only after finding that
it was necessary to "facilitate the legal adoption of the child").
119, See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 907 (3d cd.) (1988); see also WEBSTER'S
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1268 (2d ed.) (2001) (defining "negotiate" as "to arrange for or bring
about by discussion or settlement of terms").
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-3-201 (2007).
12L See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. CODE § 20-281(10) (2007) (in the context of insurance dealings),
122. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540.I(h) (2007) (in public education employment statutes); see
also D.C, CODE § 2-301.07 (2007) (in a procurement statute, meaning "to determine the terms and
conditions of a contract").
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good faith, connection, mindfulness, harmony, and "treating the other ... as
a person."123
With these definitions in mind, how is it that "facilitate" and "negotiate" might perform as "terministic screens" in the work-family context? As
a starting point, using the word "facilitate" to describe the relationship between employer and employee in the work-family context places the employer in a position of responsibility for "assisting" the employee in
managing both work and family life. This makes sense, of course, because
the employer has power to change the structure of the workplace in a way
that an employee does not. Yet, instead of placing the employer in the position of guaranteeing "accommodation" of family life at work, "facilitate"
suggests the employer's duty is one of "empowerment"-to assist employees in their own processes of successfully blending work and family-similar to the role that facilitators in other contexts play. "Facilitate" subtly
offers that the employee and the employer are working together to develop
a plan to allocate available resources for managing work and family, and
the employer is helping the employee lessen resistance in the movement
between family and work rather than giving an employee preferential treatment that other employees do not receive. Thus, instead of promoting policies that "accommodate" family life in the workplace, which arguably
suggests that the burden is exclusively on the employer to "give up" something for the benefit of the employee, policies might be recast in terms of
"facilitating transitions" between work and family to increase the level of
performance and productivity in both settings.
Instead of a one-way guarantee implied by the use of "accommodation," "facilitate" offers that work-family relationships can be the result of
"two-way" communication between workers and employers. Moreover, "facilitate" includes in its meaning the kinds of actions employers might take
in helping employees manage work and family-educating, providing documents, scheduling, communicating-all in an effort to help employees
with decisions and choices that affect their lives. Taking a "facilitation"
view of work and family may promote as policy what employees and employers already often do informally-work together to come up with arrangements that are beneficial to both employees and employers in pursuing
their interests.
Unlike the language of "accommodation" in the FMLA, which implies
a tension between employees' family needs and employers' interest in
"high performance organizations," using "facilitate" to describe the effort to
manage work and family life implies that the interests of employers and
workers can be coextensive and pursued in tandem. For example, Naomi
Cahn and Michael Selmi use the language of "facilitation" to suggest that
123. See generally John D. Feerick, What's Fair: Ethics for Negotiators, 18 GEO. 1. LEGAL
Ennes 251 (2004) (discussing the writings of scholars exploring the area of negotiation ethics).
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more work-family policies are needed to "facilitate women's commitment
to the workplace."124 "Facilitation" can be used to describe work and family
as complementary goals rather than as goals that require one party in the
relationship to neglect some interests in order to advance others. In other
words, "facilitate" can convey a sense that the work-family relationship is
more than a "zero-sum" game where every accommodation comes at a related burden. Rather, "facilitate" reflects the reality that employers are primarily in charge of workplaces but that workplace and family goals can be
coordinated and jointly advanced.
Similarly, work-family policies might be described as those that allow
workers to more easily "negotiate" their identities or roles as workers and
family members. Work-family scholars writing in the communication field
suggest that the focus in reforming the relationship between work and family should not be exclusively on enacting policies that address logistical
concerns or promote the idea of "balance;,,125 rather, they assert that the
goal of work-family scholars should be to understand how the identities of
workers as family members are negotiated through language. 126
Using a "negotiating identity" lens to examine work-family conflict
can open the language for discussing work-family policies in a way that
"accommodation," as currently constructed in legal discourse, has difficulty
achieving. For example, "negotiating" identity requires a holistic view of
the individual that accounts for both crisis events and routine family obligations as part of the employee's identity. In this way, a "negotiation" lens
moves the talk away from describing the relationship between work and
family as a process of "separating from" and "fitting into" the workplace,
with different burdens attached to each direction of movement, towards talk
that focuses on work and family as an integrated whole. Moreover, this lens
moves the discussion away from the conflict between "ideal" and "nonconforming" workers to focus instead on putting in place mechanisms that allow for individualized and multiple "ideal" work-family relationships.127
Thus, instead of framing "family" as pieces that "fit" or do not "fit" into the
existing "work" puzzle, the term "negotiate" reorients the discussion around
opportunities to design new puzzles with pieces that can fit together in multiple and equal1y useful ways.
124. Cahn & Selmi, supra nOle 10, at 450 (emphasis added) (discussing the needs of workingclass women in the pursuit of balancing work and family and concluding that working-class women need policies that enable them to work more hours rather than less-including improved
access to higher education, more public day care and longer school days).
125. Erika L. Kirby, Annis G. Golden, Caryn E. Medved, Jane Jorgenson & Patrice M. Buzzanell, An Organizational Communication Challenge to the Discourse of Work and Family Research: From Problematics to Empowerment, in 27 COMMUNICATION YEARBOOK 1, 16 (Pamela J.
Kalbfleisch ed., 2003).
126. See generally id.
127. See Ashforth, supra note 8, at 488 (arguing that employees should be given more autonomy in negotiating the relationship between work and fantily life).
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Additionally, "negotiate" suggests that the employer and employee are
conferring about ways to effectively transition between or "move through"
work and family life, are seeking in good faith to reach agreement on these
issues, and intend to reach an agreement that does not allow either to fall
short on fulfilling duties and responsibilities. 128 One work-family commentator has implicitly recognized the need for a "negotiation" frame for talking about work-family issues by advocating for "collective action" to
increase "dialogue between companies and their workforce ... [that] identif[ies], implement[s], and monitor[s)" work-family policies. 129 The emphasis on collective action also raises the possibility of giving employees more
agency in the process of rethinking workplace norms. Similar to "facilitate," then, "negotiate" implies what "accommodation" does not-a correspondence of interests, reciprocal responsibilities and an emphasis on
communication.
"Facilitate" and "negotiate" are not necessarily ideal terms that can
solve all of the difficulties one might have in envisioning new ways for
talking about work-family issues. For example, "facilitate" is linked with
"impartiality" of the facilitator, and that connection may not accurately reflect the relationship between employee and employer. "Negotiate" has a
similar problem; it suggests a relatively level playing field between employer and employee that may not actually exist in many employee-employer relationships. Yet, "facilitate" and "negotiate" are rhetorically
powerful in the context of discussing work-family issues precisely because
they overtly draw attention to the relationships of power in the employeeemployer relationship and the possibilities for redefining that relationship.
"Negotiate" is particularly useful for imagining alternative relationships between employees and employers. That is, unlike "accommodation," which
can be associated with unreasonableness and a need to impose limits to
keep an employee from abusing an accommodation, "negotiation" carries
with it connotations of reasonableness, consensus and good faith. Accordingly, "negotiate" as a term for work-family policymaking brings with it a
potential "code of ethics" for employer-employee dealings regarding workfamily issues-a code that might require mutual respect, honesty, candor,
and the pursuit of harmony. Framing the relationship between employers
and employees within a harmonizing ethic may not only provide powerful
language to create policies that equalize the bargaining power between
worker and employer but also combat the idea that, if given the opportunity,

128. See. e.g.. Fargo Educ. Ass'n v. Paulsen, 239 N.W2d 842, 847 (N.D. 1976) (defining
"negotiate in good faith" to mean that the agreement reached does not need to causc "either side
[to] surrender ... any of its duties and responsibilities").
129. Arnow-Richman, supra note 11, at 409. Arnow-Richman also carefully reviews the possibilities and challenges of reinvigorating collective bargaining as a means to achieve work-family
goals.ld. at 409-16.
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employees abuse policies that promote better movement between work and
family.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The law offers a language for talking about work and family. This language shapes reality and thus calls out for examination, interpretation and
criticism. When seeking policy changes to affect work-family relationships,
the choice of terms can expand or limit the possibilities for action; the terms
become the screen for seeing the problem and crafting a solution. As such,
sensitivity to the language chosen for expressing those policies is necessary.
The term "accommodate" is imbued with existing meanings emanating
from legal discourse that may affect the discussion about work-family policies in both intended and unintended ways. Considering language that describes workplace restructuring as an effort to "facilitate" an improved
relationship between work and family or to "negotiate" one's identity as
worker and family member might help to expand the boundaries for imagining what is possible for legal and policy approaches to work and family
issues.

